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The adoption of a new constitution,' judicial construction of the
Marketable Record Title Act, 2 and litigation involving condominiums '
are a few of the noteworthy developments in real property law during
the period of this survey.4 The homestead provisions continue as fruit-
ful sources of litigation,5 but the aspect of void gratuitous conveyances'
should recede into oblivion at some indefinite time in the future as a
result of the new constitutional provision which permits alienation by
gift.7 Cooperative and condominium apartments are now sufficiently
individualized parcels of real property to qualify for the homestead tax
exemption.' Landlords of more than five rental housing units must keep
security deposits of their tenants in trust accounts.' Full compensation
has become the sole standard for awarding compensation in all eminent
domain cases."
Because of the large number of decisions and the breadth of the
subject matter, this material represents the writer's selection of the most
noteworthy and significant developments. A reaffirmation of well-estab-
lished principles, particularly as they apply to commonly recurring fact
situations, is generally excluded.
The style of the article is similar to that of previous surveys ex-
cept that the order has been rearranged. The material is discussed in
order under the following headings:
I. ESTATES AND RELATED INTERESTS ......................................... 580
A . H om estead .......................................................... 580
1. 1968 CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATION ...................................... 580
2. CASE LAW ....................................................... 581
B. Concurrent Estates .................................................. 584
1. TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES ...................................... 584
2. LIFE ESTATE AND REMAINDER ...................................... 585
3. M INERAL ESTATES ................................................ 586
C . E asem ents .......................................................... 586
D . D edication .......................................................... 586
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comments, culled from his long experience in the study of real property law.
1. FLA. CONST. (1968). See infra I and VI.
2. See infra VIII.
3. See infra V.
4. The period covered is the 1967-69 biennium, or more specifically, from volume 198
through 225 of the Southern Reporter, Second Series.
5. See infra I.
6. See infra I.
7. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c) (1968).
8. See infra I.
9. See infra II.
10. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6 (1968). See infra VI.
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I. ESTATES AND RELATED INTERESTS
A. Homestead
1. 1968 CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATION
The 1968 Florida Constitution makes some significant changes in
the troublesome Florida homestead law and also lays the groundwork
for possible future legislative changes. Perhaps, the most important of
these changes is in the field of conveyances. The new constitution suc-
cinctly provides that the homestead may be alienated "by mortgage, sale
or gift."'" By the insertion of the word "gift," this new document changes
that whole line of bothersome cases which voided gratuitous conveyances
when the head of the family had children or lineal descendants. 12 The
new constitution also provides that the homestead owner may "transfer
the title to an estate by the entirety with the spouse."'18 This change was
long overdue. The restriction on alienation by gift not only caused em-
barrassing and unfortunate title problems, it also thwarted the desires
of the homeowner. It is to be pointed out, however, that the problem
will remain for a considerable time to come.' 4 The new constitution has
no retroactive effect and conveyances which occurred before its effec-
tive date, January 7, 1969, will necessarily be governed by the former
law.
The requirement that both spouses join in a conveyance of the
homestead, when that relationship exists, is retained under the new
constitution, as is the requirement of two witnesses (because of the
conveyancing statute)-" Nothing specifically is mentioned about ac-
knowledgment, but this is still required for recording purposes, if nothing
11. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c) (1968).
12. See, e.g., Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962), aff'g 122 So.2d 322 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1960) ; Florida National Bank v. Winn, 158 Fla. 750, 30 So.2d 298 (1947) ; Jackson v. Jack-
son, 90 Fla. 563, 107 So. 255 (1925) ; Gotshall v. Taylor, 196 So.2d 479 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967) ;
Cahill v. Chesley, 189 So.2d 818 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966) ; Porter v. Childers, 162 So.2d 301 (Fla.
3rd Dist. 1964) ; Marsh v. Hartley, 109 So.2d 34 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
13. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c) (1968).
14. Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962) demonstrated that a deed void under the
homestead law because it was gratuitous could be set aside more than 20 years later, and
that claimants under the title predating the void deed were not barred by the statute of
limitations, the recording act, or other considerations. The Marketable Record Title Act
(FLA. STAT. § 712.01 et seq. (1969)) was not in effect at that time and was not considered.
15. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c) (1968) requires both spouses to join in a deed of the
homestead. The conveyancing statute, FLA. STAT. § 689.01 (1969) requires two witnesses
for any conveyance. See R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 21.03[2][a] for
a discussion of requirements under the former constitution and § 21.03[2][b] as to the new
constitution.
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else." A significant factor in the new constitution is the provision that
if the owner or spouse is incompetent, then the method of alienation or
encumbrance shall be as provided by law. 7 There was no similar pro-
vision in the former constitution, which required alienation by the owner
joined by the spouse when that relationship existed. Thus, if either were
incompetent, there was apparently no method of conveying or encumber-
ing the homestead. The new provision is most salutary.
The new constitution has restrictions on the devise of the home-
stead which are not identical to those under the old document. The for-
mer constitution provided that the homestead could not be devised if
the owner were survived by children; 8 the new constitution prohibits the
devise of a homestead if the owner is survived by a spouse or minor
child.'" Unless or until the legislature changes the provisions regulating
the descent of homesteads,2" however, the prohibition against devise and
the descent thereof should remain the same under both documents.2 '
Owners of cooperative and condominium apartments became eligible
for the homestead taxation exemption in 1969 as a result of 1967 legis-
lation22 and the ratification of the new constitution.2" The exemption
was extended by 1969 legislation to include condominiums organized
on a long-term lease.2"
2. CASE LAW2 5
The definitional enigmas of the elements of "homestead" for cred-
itor-exemption and descent purposes were once again the subject of ap-
pellate controversy.
The "head of the household" element was not lost in Beensen v.
Burgess26 when the divorced owner's daughter married so long as she
16. FLA. STAT. § 695.03 (1969).
17. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c) (1968).
18. FLA. CONST. 1885 as amended, art. X, § 4.
19. FLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 4(c) (1968).
20. Saxon v. Rawls, 51 Fla. 555, 41 So. 594 (1906) and Thomas v. Williamson, 51 Fla.
332, 40 So. 831 (1906) upheld an early statute limiting the devise of a homestead.
21. FLA. STAT. § 731.05(1) (1969) prohibits the devise of a homestead when the owner
leaves either a "widow or lineal descendants or both." Note the difference in language
between this statute, the 1885 constitutional provision, and the 1968 Constitution. The
matter is discussed at length in R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 21.03[3].
FLA. STAT. § 731.27 (1969) regulates the descent of homestead.
22. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-339, codified in a note to FLA. STAT. § 192.12 (1967). The
statute was to be effective January 1 of the year following the adoption of a constitutional
provision. Id.
23. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (1968) provides in part: "The real estate may be
held . . . as a condominium, or indirectly by stock ownership or membership representing
the owner's or member's proprietary interest in a corporation owning a fee or a leasehold
initially in excess of ninety-eight years .... "
24. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-68, amending FLA. STAT. § 192.13 (1967), extends eligibility
to "lessees owning the leasehold interest in a bona fide lease having an original term of
ninety-eight (98) years or more, in a condominium parcel as defined in Chapter 711 Florida
Statutes . ... "
25. Needless to say, all the cases arose under the former constitution.
26. 218 So.2d 517 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
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continued living with her father. The owner had sold a prior homestead
to purchase his present home and had given up the prior home to the
vendee two weeks before the sale. The court ruled that this was not an
abandonment." Therefore, the "head of the household" status was re-
tained irrespective of the "family's" residing in another home tempo-
rarily.
In re Estate of Van Meter2" involved the question of whether the
homestead (for purposes of descent and distribution) had been aban-
doned. The claimant (widow of the landowner) had separated from her
husband eleven years prior to his death and had filed suit for and ob-
tained separate maintenance. The court reversed the lower court's hold-
ing that the property constituted homestead and ruled that the family
relationship must have existed at the time of death. There were no chil-
dren of the marriage and no "family" living on the husband's land at the
time of his death. Certainly, the Van Meter house was not a "home" to
Mrs. Van Meter and the court ruled that it was not a homestead.
Property which is contiguous to an already-established homestead
and which is purchased after a judgment has been awarded against the
owners is exempt from the claims of creditors under the circumstances
of the following case. The supreme court in Quigley v. Kennedy & Ely
Insurance, Inc."9 held that when a husband and wife established a home-
stead, and then, after a judgment had been levied, purchased an adjacent
tract making the aggregate acreage for the rural home less than 160 acres
(i.e., 15 acres), the entire acreage could be claimed as homestead. The
high court reiterated the principle that the exemption provision should be
liberally construed in the interest of protecting the family home. °
The Quigley case also decided that although at the time the owners
purchased the property they were already judgment debtors, the property
was exempt. The reasoning was that since the property immediately
became homestead upon purchase, the lien and the homestead right
attached at the same time and priority should therefore be given to the
claimant of the homestead right."'
Liens and homestead rights, however, do not attach to the same
types of estates, and this legal consequence produced a tragic effect in
the final appellate determination of the LaGasse case."2 The facts of that
case, as more sympathetically stated by the district court," are as
follows: Kathleen LaGasse signed an indemnity agreement on a bond for
27. Id. at 519.
28. 214 So.2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968), aff'd, 231 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1970).
29. 207 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1968), rev'g, 202 So.2d 610 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
30. Id. at 432. Weiss v. Stone, 220 So.2d 402 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) upheld the trial
court's determination that the owner of three contiguous parcels, one of which had a five-
unit building, could only claim as homestead the property actually occupied (he lived in
one unit) and an easement for ingress and egress.
31. Id. at 433.
32. Aetna Ins. Co. v. LaGasse, 223 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1969).
33. LaGasse v. Aetna Ins. Co., 213 So.2d 454 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
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her husband's business. Upon the husband's default, plaintiff creditor got
a judgment against all indemnitors, except the husband, and including
Kathleen.
Kathleen and her daughter were deserted by her husband. Kathleen
took a job as a waitress. Kathleen's father died and the property
Kathleen later claimed as homestead descended to her mother for life
with a remainder to Kathleen.
Kathleen went home (to the homestead property) to care for her
mother who had terminal cancer and paid most of the expenses out of her
meager earnings. Her other house was lost through foreclosure. On her
mother's death, the plaintiff creditor attempted to levy on the property.
The district court found for Kathleen and held that her title was
only prospective at the time of her father's death and therefore the ques-
tion of whether the lien attached was immaterial.84 The supreme court,
however, reversed. The title in fee vested in the remainderman, Kathleen,
at the time of her father's death, not at the death of the life tenant who
had the right of possession during the life tenancy. Thus, the recorded
lien attached instantly when title passed, but the homestead right did not
because the life tenant still had the right of use and occupancy essential
to the homestead claim. Kathleen's residence in the home and caring for
her mother did not divest the life tenant of her paramount present
interest. 5
In the case of Heath v. First National Bank,8" the married woman
was more successful in avoiding an encumbrance on the homestead. In
that case, Mrs. Heath joined in a mortgage on the homestead so that her
husband could borrow funds for his business. The first district court held
that a mere signature by the wife was not sufficient to hold her liable. The
signature must be made after the party was named in the instrument.
The decision was also based on the fact that the mortgagee failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to show that the wife had signed in the presence
of two subscribing witnesses. In this case, the problem concerned the
proper method of encumbering a homestead held by the entireties. In La-
Gasse, the validity of the judgment as against the wife was not ques-
tioned, and the court held that the lien attached before the property be-
came the homestead of the claimant.
Certain claims are specifically excluded from homestead exemption.
The petitioner in Graham v. Azar"T argued that her claim against the
34. Id. at 457.
35. 223 So.2d 727, 728-29 (Fla. 1969). Even if we accept the logic of the majority
opinion, the question remains as to the applicability of FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 2 (1885).
This section states that "the exemptions provided in Section 1 shall inure to the widow
and heirs of the party entitled to such exemption . . . ." Chief Justice Ervin, one of two
dissenting justices, referred to this section without elaboration as a supporting reason for
granting the exemption. Prima facie it would seem applicable. The majority's opinion
should have explained why it was not.
36. 213 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
37. 204 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1967).
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respondent, her former husband, should, by judicial interpretation, also
be excluded from the homestead (personal property) exemption. The
claim was for child support of the owner's (respondent's) children by a
previous marriage. The supreme court ruled that the claim was protected
by the homestead exemption since it was not specifically excepted in the
constitution. The vigorous dissent by Justice Ervin is very convincing-
why should a father be relieved of the obligation of supporting his chil-
dren because of a divorce decree and subsequent remarriage? Again, the
homestead provisions effected the result which was the antithesis of their
underlying spirit-protecting the family.
The homestead provision also includes the business house, if it is
on the same property as the home and is the means of livelihood for the
family. In Heil Co. v. Lavieri,8 the debtor was a franchised agent of the
creditor and signed promissory notes to the creditor to help finance his
business. Pending an action on the notes, the defendant was divorced and
moved into the building on his business property and then remarried. The
second district held the business-residence property exempt.
B. Concurrent Estates
1. TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES
An estate by the entireties may be created by a "strawman" con-
veyance of the homestead to the husband and wife if it is supported by
valuable consideration." Accordingly, such a conveyance was upheld
in the case of Betts v. Hawkins4 ° The husband married his second wife
and conveyed an interest in the homestead to her as an estate by the
entireties. Thereafter, she sold her former home and deposited the money
in a joint bank account. Her money was used to make repairs on the
homestead property. When the daughter of the first marriage sought to
attack the conveyance, the second district ruled that the conveyance was
good since it was supported by valuable consideration.
The new constitution, article 10, section 4, now validates convey-
ances, without consideration, to the husband and wife as tenants by the
entireties. A wife who held title with her husband as a tenancy by the
entirety in business property (another portion of the property stood in
the husband's name alone) conveyed the property to a corporation for
the sake of convenience. She received nothing in return, but the husband
received shares of stock. In a later action for divorce, the wife received
alimony but no compensation for her "interest" in this property. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal held that since ordinarily upon divorce a
tenancy by the entireties becomes a tenancy-in-common, and since the
wife had received no stock for a transfer of these rights at a happier
period of time in the marriage, a constructive trust for the benefit of the
38. 205 So.2d 21 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
39. See Hay v. Wanner, 204 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1953).
40. 202 So.2d 135 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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wife should be imposed on a portion of the husband's stock."' One judge
dissented, arguing a constructive trust required strong, unequivocal
evidence of misconduct.
42
The frequent case of the older children suing the second wife, con-
testing her succession to an estate by the entireties, presented an interest-
ing twist in Losey v. Losey.4" The first wife and husband conveyed a
interest in lands which they held as an estate by the entireties to each of
their three children, also executing partnership agreements acknowledg-
ing that all parties had an equal interest in the property. The first wife
died devising her property to her children. The husband remarried and
executed a deed creating a tenancy by the entireties in one-fourth of the
property with the second wife. The husband and the children then sought
to set aside the conveyance. The supreme court reversed the third district
and held that the tenancy by the entireties between the first wife and the
husband continued after the conveyance to the children, 44 therefore he
owned a one-fourth interest in the land when he made the conveyance
to the second wife. The Chief Justice dissented, arguing that the partner-
ship agreements, and events leading thereto, showed that the husband
and first wife created a tenancy-in-common out of their tenancy by the
entireties.
4 5
When the husband purchases property and takes the deed in his
name and that of his wife, the presumption arises that he intended to
make a gift. This presumption can only be overcome by conclusive ev-
idence. This does not mean that the burden of going forward shifts to the
party disclaiming the gift, but that the evidence is tested by "beyond a
reasonable doubt, rather than preponderance. 46
2. LIFE ESTATE AND REMAINDER
An orange crop, cultivated by the life tenant, was growing on her
property at the time of her death. The Second District Court of Appeal
ruled that the crop passed as real property to the remainderman, not as
personal property to the life tenant's administrator.47 The court followed
cases holding that in Florida, the fruit follows the realty unless specif-
ically reserved (for the tenant of the defeasible fee). 41 The remainder-
man, however, was liable for the cost of cultivation on the theory of
unjust enrichment.
41. Hoke v. Hoke, 202 So.2d 118 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
42. Id. at 121 (dissenting opinion).
43. 221 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1969).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 419 (dissenting opinion).
46. Schoenrock v. Schoenrock, 202 So.2d 571, 574 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
47. Peer v. Willson, 210 So.2d 495 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
48. See Adams v. Adams, 158 Fla. 173, 28 So.2d 254, 255 (1946), which refused to
distinguish between fructus industriales and fructus naturales.
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3. MINERAL ESTATES
The 1969 legislature amended Florida Statutes section 193.22(1)
providing for separate taxation of subsurface rights in real property. 9
P & N Investment Co. v. Florida Ranchettes, Inc.50 combined the
questions of the rights of the holder of a mineral estate versus the surface
owner and the rights of a cotenant of a mineral estate versus his fellow
cotenant. Plaintiff was the holder of the surface rights to the land and
also owner of one-half the mineral estate. The court held on rehearing
that as a subsurface owner defendant could enter the land for exploration
and mining without the permission of the plaintiff as surface owner. He
could also mine the land without the permission of plaintiff as cotenant,
with a right to reimbursement of expenses and subject to an accounting.
C. Easements
Hurt v. Lenchuk5' dealt with the problem of the easement rights of
owners in a subdivision to the streets and facilities on the plat to which
their deeds refer. Defendant owners abutted on a street which appeared
on the plat but had been vacated by the city and also abutted on a park
which appeared on the plat. Defendants obstructed the street and placed
along the park fences and hedges which encroached onto park property.
The other owners sued to have these obstructions removed. The court
held that the encroachments on the park area should be removed because
owners in the subdivision, having purchased their property with reference
to the plat, acquired by implied covenant a private easement in all of the
park.52 The court said if the city vacated the street, the abutting land-
owners became the legal owners of the portion vacated subject to any
easements which may have become vested in other owners in the sub-
division. The court, however, refused to apply the "liberal view" as to
the rights of subdivision owners to platted streets because it would not
be practical. The owner's rights were limited to such rights as are reason-
ably and materially beneficial to the grantees, deprivation of which would
reduce the value of their property.53 The street involved in this case did
not meet that criteria.
D. Dedication
In addition to statutory dedication under Florida Statutes Section
337.31, it is also possible to have a common-law dedication in Florida.
Unlike statutory dedication, common-law dedication can result in an
acceptance of the full width of the property offered without the necessity
of the public's improving or repairing the full amount of the property
49. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-60.
50. 220 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969), as amended on rehearing.
51. 223 So.2d 350 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
52. Id. at 352.
53. Id.
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offered. 4 In Smith v. City of Melbourne,55 the grantor did not object
when a road was built over his property. He conveyed the property to the
grantee, subject to a plat showing a 30-foot easement across the property
for the street. The city had not used the entire 30 feet, but the court
applied common-law dedication and ruled it had an easement for the
entire 30 feet.
City of Miami v. Eastern Realty Co.,5" was an unusual case involv-
ing concepts of dedication, easement, and water rights. In 1914, the
plaintiff's predecessor platted a subdivision containing a dedication of a
park strip along Biscayne Bay. In 1963, when the defendant City of
Miami was negotiating to fill in submerged lands along Biscayne Bay
to create public parks, it passed a resolution accepting the dedication of
the park strip on the assumption that it had been dedicated to the public.
A zoning commission meeting was noticed and held to decide plans for the
park, and no objection was interposed by the subdivider or his successors
in interest.
The trustees of the internal improvement fund transferred title to
the adjoining land to the city, for public purposes only, so that the land
could be filled. While this was going on, unknown parties acquired the
subdivider's old corporation and quitclaim deeds to the land. The cor-
porate plaintiff then brought suit claiming that the dedication had been
a private, not a public one, and claiming title to the adjacent filled-in
land as part of its riparian rights.57 The third district ruled that although
originally the dedication had been a private one, the facts indicated an
abandonment of the original offer of a private dedication and a resulting
public dedication."8 Thus, the City of Miami obtained an easement in the
park strip for the use of the public."
E. Water Rights
1. RIPARIAN RIGHTS
City of Miami v. Eastern Realty Co., Inc., discussed supra, also
ruled on the issue of riparian rights. The court stated that: 1) an owner
of land who has dedicated it does not retain the riparian rights unless
they are expressly reserved; 10 2) assuming the plaintiff were the owner
of the land, he did not have a right to the submerged lands but only a
preferential right to purchase them;6 ' 3) when the trustees of the Inter-
54. Indian Rocks Beach So. Shore, Inc. v. Ewell, 59 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1952).
55. 211 So.2d 66 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
56. 202 So.2d 760 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
57. The courts decision as to these riparian rights is discussed at p. 587 inira.
58. 202 So.2d at 763.
59. Id. This public easement was said to blend with the private easement of the lot
owners and that the two could exist contemporaneously.
60. Id. at 770.
61. Id. at 771. See also Tri-State Enterprise, Inc. v. Berkowitz, 182 So.2d 40 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1966).
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nal Improvement Fund give an easement to the city in submerged lands
to create a public park thereon, they do not violate the statute against sale
to one other than the owner; 62 and 4) after submerged lands are filled
in, the owner's right is limited to a conveyance from the trustees of land
not used for a public or municipal purpose."3 Therefore, the plaintiffs did
not have any rights in the filled-in submerged lands adjoining a park
strip which they had dedicated. 4
An apartment building was constructed on a lake surrounded by
homes, and the tenants in the apartment building used the lake exces-
sively and without regard to water safety. The third district, in Silver
Blue Lake Apartments, Inc. v. Silver Blue Lake Home Owners Associa-
tion,15 held that it was proper to restrain all tenants from use of the lake
and to allow only owners of land lying under the lake to use all of the
waters.
Florida Statutes section 298.74 requires written consent of abutting
owners to draw water so as to lower the level of a lake over two square
miles in area. Brown v. Ellingson" held that the statutory permission
applies not only to drainage of a lake but also to an abutting land owner
drawing water for irrigation purposes if the level of the lake is lowered.
When a man-made lake in a subdivision was joined by man-made
canals also in the subdivision and the lake was platted as being dedicated
to the joint and several use of the owners of lots fronting on the lake,
those owners were entitled to erect a fence preventing the access of owners
of lots on the canal. 7 The court concluded that the easement for recrea-




Article 10, section 11 of the new constitution provides that the state
shall have title to lands under navigable waters within the boundaries of
the state if the lands have not been alienated as sovereignty lands.68 Sale
or private use of the lands may be authorized by law when it is not
contrary to the public interest.
The 1969 legislature amended section 253.12 of the Florida Statutes
to provide that title to all sovereignty tidal and submerged bottom lands
is vested in the trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund.69 This
62. FLA. STAT. § 253.12 (1965). See City of Miami v. Eastern Realty Co., 202 So.2d
760, 771 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
63. 202 So.2d at 771-72.
64. Id. at 772.
65. 225 So.2d 557 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
66. 224 So.2d 391 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
67. Reiger v. Anchor Post Prod., Inc., 210 So.2d 283 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
68. FLA. CONSr. art. 10, § 11 (1968).
69. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-308. The Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund were
renamed "Board of Trustees." Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-106, 1 27.
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gives the trustees the same authority over fresk water as over salt water
lands.
The legislature also provided that the trustees may lease submerged
lands for aquaculture activity for a maximum initial term of 10 years.70
Other legislation dealt with conservation of submerged lands. 71
b. Case Law
The grants made by Franklin County of rights to plant oyster beds
did not convey a valid, vested right because such grants did not comply
with article IV, section 14 of the Florida Constitution of 1885, requiring
the seal of the state and signature and countersignature of the Governor
and Secretary of State. Based on this premise, the supreme court in
Bryant v. Lovett 72 held that the 1961 act of the legislature requiring
registration and rental of oyster leases78 and grants was not invalid as to
holders of the Franklin County grants.
A review of rulings by the city commission on a petition to establish
bulkhead lines may be had by certiorari to the circuit court since the
Bulkhead Act of 196771 took precedence over the earlier administrative
procedure act. 5
The Bulkhead Act requires that "formal approval" of the trustees of
the Internal Improvement Fund is necessary to obtain a dredge and fill
permit after approval by the board of county commissioners. Based on a
prior similar holding,76 the third district held that the trustees had no
discretion in the approval of such a permit.7
F. Boundaries
1. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Title and boundary line disputes between adjoining property may be
resolved by a line agreed to as the true boundary line between the disput-
ing parties, either by express or implied agreement, or by acquiescence. In
Williams v. Johntry,78 the court held that where the parties and their
predecessors had occupied land recognizing a fence as a boundary, that
boundary was established although the line was not the true one accord-
ing to a subsequent survey. The court did not distinguish clearly be-
70. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-46.
71. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-342 (established Boca Ciega Aquatic Preserve); ch. 69-337
(requires conservation reports be requested from state boards within 30 days after an
application for sale, bulkhead lines or dredging or filling of submerged land); ch. 69-64
(makes it a crime to obstruct navigable waters with traps).
72. 201 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1967).
73. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-502, now codified as FLA. STAT. § 370.161 (1967).
74. FLA. STAT. § 253.122 (1967).
75. FLA. STAT. § 120.31(1) (1967).
76. Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Venetian Isles Development Corp., 166
So.2d 765 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
77. Burns v. Wiseheart, 205 So.2d 708 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1968).
78. 214 So.2d 62 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1968).
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tween acquiescence and agreement. Reil v. Myers79 did distinguish a
boundary established by agreement from one established by acquiescence.
In that case, the parties had disputed over the boundary, agreed orally
that a surveyor's line would be treated as the one true line, and complied
with this agreement for two years. The court upheld the boundary line
as established by agreement.
2. LOCATION OF BOUNDARIES
When a description of property is ambiguous, a natural monument
prevails over courses and distances, and courses and distances prevail
over quantity. In the case of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund
v. Wetstone, ° however, the natural monument was the hightide line
which could not be located with any precision. As a result, the court held
that the meander line (described by courses and distances) prevailed. One
judge dissented, saying that the difficulty of locating the natural mon-
ument was no excuse for not using the highwater line."x
Mogee v. Haller8 2 held that although the first part of a description
did not make sense, a sufficient description remained for purpose of
identification, with the call controlling.
G. Adverse Possession
Chasteen v. Chasteen" involved adverse possession under the color
of title. After the death of grandfather Chasteen, his widow lived with
the children and grandchildren on his 200-acre property. The sheriff sold
the property to a creditor of grandfather Chasteen although the widow
claimed the property as homestead. The creditor then deeded the prop-
erty to one of the Chasteen sons who cut timber on the property, main-
tained it, and paid taxes on it since 1942. The first district court ruled
that although adverse possession operated against the older children
since they knew of their brother's deed and claim on the land; the
minor grandchildren did not have actual knowledge of the deed and did
not know their uncle was claiming the land for himself, so adverse
possession was not valid against them.
The district courts are split on whether one who adversely possesses
a strip of land, contiguous to land he owns under a valid deed, can be
deemed to be possessing under "color of title" within the meaning of the
Florida Statutes.84 In Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. California Chemical
Co.,85 the fourth district accepted the first-district view that such adverse
79. 222 So.2d 42 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
80. 222 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1969).
81. Id. at 16 (Ervin, J. dissenting).
82. 222 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
83. 213 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
84. FLA. STAT. § 95.17(2) (1967). See Blackburn v. Florida W. Coast Land & Devel.
Co., 109 So.2d 413 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959) holding that it does not qualify as color of title
and Kiser v. Howard, 133 So.2d 746 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961) holding that it does.
85. 210 So.2d 757 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
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possession was under color of title. The court also held that the possession
is adverse when one takes possession up to the mistaken boundary line
believing the property to be his.
Forman v. Ward"8 held that adverse possession without color of
title was acquired when the description of land, returned to the tax
assessor, merely contained a reference to the book and page number of
the deed filed with the clerk because the statute for the assessment
recognized the method.87
H. Covenants and Equitable Servitudes
Voight v. Harbour Heights Improvement Association88 involved
covenants running with the land which required owners in a development
to file their building plans with an agent of the subdivider and receive his
approval before building. Such plans had to meet the requirements of the
Fort Lauderdale building code. The agent rejected the defendants' plans
for a seven-story, multi-family unit, which appeared to be within the
building code. The court held that covenants for approval of construc-
tion would be upheld if they were exercised reasonably. Since the deed
restrictions provided for multi-family units on these lots, the limitations
on building them could only be as to height. Therefore, approval of the
agent must be given if there was conformance with the express require-
ments of the building code. The deed covenants in the case of Henthorn
v. Tri Par Land Development Corp.88 provided for an annual charge to
be paid by all owners. The covenants were to run until the year 2000
according to an accompanying agreement of record, and were thereafter
subject to renewal. The court upheld the covenants because they were not
indefinite but did not uphold the renewals. The renewals were invalid for
the same policy reasons which applied to the rule against perpetuities.
I. Dower, Curtesy, and the Ownership of Property by Married Women
Section V of article X of the new constitution now provides that there
is to be no distinction between married men and married women in the
holding, control, disposition, or other encumbering of their property,
except that dower and curtesy may be established and regulated by law.
This not only invites the legislature to establish curtesy in Florida, it
also abrogates the requirement in Florida Statutes section 708.04 that the
husband join in the wife's conveyances.
After the time for electing dower had expired, the executrix filed a
petition for a declaratory decree determining heirs and next of kin. After
86. 219 So.2d 68 (1st Dist. 1969).
87. FLA. STAT. § 193.20 (1967).
88. 218 So.2d 803 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
89. 221 So.2d 465 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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the court order, the widow elected dower. The first district held that the
widow's right of reelection was not reinstated by the petition.90
A wife who jointly and severally with her husband executed a de-
mand note secured by stock to a bank could not complain of the bank's
selling the stock as executor, discharging the debt, and only including
the excess in the estate for purposes of calculating the widow's dower.91
II. LANDLORD AND TENANT
A. Security Deposits-Legislation
The 1969 Legislature made an addition to chapter 83 of the Florida
Statutes dealing with landlord and tenant. Applicable only to the rental
of housing units, section 83.39 now requires a landlord to hold in trust
any security deposit in excess of $100 in an escrow account or to post a
bond to secure refund of the deposit.9 2 Section 3 of the statute provides
that upon termination of the lease, the landlord has 15 days to return the
deposit or to give a tenant a 15-day notice of his intent to claim the
deposit. This section also contains a prophylactic provision that a tenant
can not waive his rights under the statute, thus preventing circumvention
by standard form and adhesion contracts. Landlords who rent fewer
than five individual housing units are excepted from coverage. One
problem with the legislation is that no penalty for its violation is pro-
vided.
B. Damages for Termination of Lease
An interesting factual situation presented several appellate contests
for the third district on the issue of damages. The defendant had leased
Miami Beach Convention Hall for the World Heavyweight Championship
boxing match from the plaintiff, the City of Miami Beach. The plaintiff-
city's boxing commission was informed that the champion had a bad
knee so the commission ordered him examined (the law so required), 9
and advised the defendant that the champion should not participate.
Defendant acquiesced, postponed the fight, and then refused to pay.
The court held that this was not a frustration of purpose which would
excuse performance by the lessee. The lessor had not brought about the
frustration because the disabling injury, not the city's examinations, was
the cause of the fight's postponement.94 Further, the lease provided that
the risk of loss was on the lessee, and the event which happened was a
foreseeable one. The lessee could have provided for such a contingency
in the lease.
90. In re Estate of Arner, 218 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
91. In re Estate of Trinter, 212 So.2d 355 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
92. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-282.
93. FLA. STAT. § 548.04 (1961) requires that it be attested by a physician that the
boxer is physically fit.
94. City of Miami Beach v. Championship Sports, Inc., 200 So.2d 583 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1967).
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On the question of the amount of damages, the case was again
appealed. The court finally held, withdrawing an earlier opinion,95 that
the provision in the lease that liquidated damages would equal the full
rent, including any disbursements or expenses, would not be conclusive. 0
Damages should be awarded on the amount actually proved.
A subsidiary of Jefferson stores sued United States Rubber, its
lessee, for breach of an agreement to lease. The case, Jefferson Realty v.
United States Rubber Co.,97 after summary judgment as to liability, went
to trial on the issue of damages. The jury returned a verdict only for the
parent corporation. The supreme court held that the verdict did not mean
a lack of proof of damages. 8 It only indicated that the parent alone had
suffered and was entitled to damages. The court also held the joinder
of the parent after summary judgment was proper, although necessarily
amounting to a grant of summary judgment as to liability for the benefit
of the parent corporation.
Following the majority rule in the United States,"' the third district
held that pro rata recovery of the broker's commission is not recoverable
as damages by the lessor.Y00
C. Distress
A case of first impression arose in the fourth district. Dobbs v.
Petko'01 held that when a lease provided for acceleration of the rent upon
default of the tenant, the remedy of distress was available to the landlord
to obtain a warrant for the entire sum due.' °2
D. Provision in Lease for Title to Goods to Pass to Landlord
A rent lien is superior to a tax warrant. 08 But, is it still superior
when the lease provides that upon abandonment by the tenant, the land-
lord will get title to the stock of goods of the tenant? The Fourth District
Court of Appeal answered no 0 4 on the basis that such transfer after
95. Filed November 26, 1968, apparently not published.
96. Championship Sports, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 221 So.2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1969). Although the court did not in so many words so state, the provision for liquidated
damages was apparently construed as a penalty since under its terms the city would have
recovered the rent plus expenses on a breach, whereas if there were no breach the city
would have recovered only the rent and would have had to bear the expenses itself.
97. 222 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1969).
98. The district court seemed to think it did. United States Rubber Co. v. Jefferson
Realty, 208 So.2d 110, 112 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
99. See, e.g., Manning v. Pounds, 2 Conn. Cir. 344, 199 A.2d 188 (1963); Wihelm
Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud, 197 Minn. 626, 268 N.W. 634 (1936).
100. Mutual Employees Trademan v. Silverman, 202 So.2d 826 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
101. 207 So.2d 11 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968). The court's only cited authority was a federal
case discussing Florida law, In re J. E. DeBelle Co., 286 F. 699 (S.D. Fla. 1923), indicating
that a landlord's lien is available only for the amount of rent accrued. The Dobbs court
distinguished the case of an acceleration clause.
102. 207 So.2d at 12.
103. Jacob v. Kirk, 223 So.2d 795, 797 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), and cases cited therein.
104. Id.
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tenant's abandonment amounts to a sale. Therefore, the statutory pro-
visions relating to a dealer's sale of his stock of goods applies.105 Thus,
not only is the property subject to the tax warrant, but the landlord, as
successor owner of the personal property, is personally liable for the
taxes. 06 An alternative basis of the decision was that the landlord's lien
was effective only for accrued rent, not for future rent or other sums
owed the landlord, and since the landlord had already recovered that
much, the enforcement of the tax warrant as to the remainder of the
goods was permissible.
E. Renewals of Leases
Leases which endure in perpetuity are not favored. With this
principle underlying its decision, the first district held that a lease pro-
viding for an option of renewal every five years could only have one
renewal. The court declared that the lease's lack of specificity as to the
manner of paying rent beyond the first five years prevented it from being
clear and unequivocal enough to allow perpetual renewal.'0 7
F. Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
If possession is not nine-tenths of the law, as an old saying goes, it is
indeed a protected interest as first-year property students know. In
Floro v. Parker,' the court reversed a summary judgment for the plain-
tiff in an unlawful detainer proceeding in view of the need for factual
determinations, i.e., whether the plaintiff was in possession; not whether
the plaintiff had the legal right of possession. A person out of possession
is not entitled to resort to self-help in asserting ownership, but instead he
must bring a proper legal action."0 9
Tollius v. Dutch Inns of America, Inc."' held that equitable defenses
could not be determined by unlawful detainer action because the action
did not bar a subsequent suit in equity. The court then enjoined the
unlawful detainer action because actions at law may be enjoined when
equitable relief is available.
G. Repair and Improvements of the Leasehold
A lessor fee owner who conveys the reversionary interest subject to
a leasehold is thereby relieved of any obligation to repair defects which
105. FLA. STAT. § 212.10(1) (1967).
106. Jacobs v. Kirk, 223 So.2d 795 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969). The tax lienor did not seek
imposition of personal liability so it was not imposed in this case.
107. Hutson v. Knabb, 212 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
108. 205 So.2d 363 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967). See Goffin v. McCall, 91 Fla. 514, 108 So. 556
(1926) for a historical discussion of the action.
109. 205 So.2d 363 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
110. 218 So.2d 504 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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occur subsequent to the transfer. In accordance with the general rule, the
covenant to repair runs with the land."'
The lessee rented property for the purpose of building a gas station.
At the time of leasing, the lessor consented to raising the grade of the
property so that the lessor could utilize it better. When traffic near the
property increased, the lessee needed to regrade the premises. He could
not get the permission of the lessor. The lessee offered to post sufficient
bond to cover restoration of the property when the leasehold terminated
and brought a declaratory judgment to permit regrading. The First
District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment for the lessee because
eminent domain had created a situation not anticipated by the parties."'
III. MECHANic's LIEN AND RELATED LIENS
A. Mechanic's Liens
The sub-subcontractor was held to be within the purview of the
mechanic's lien statute'" in Ceco Corp. v. Goldberg."4 The court said
that the statute should be construed liberally according to general equi-
table principles so as to best protect the interests of those enhancing
realty. The holding, however, was in direct conflict with the earlier
decision of J. P. Driver Co., v. Claxton"5 in the second district.
The vendee or equitable owner of property constitutes an owner
within the definition of the Florida Statutes."' Based on this premise,
the second district held that when the vendee contracted with the plain-
tiff for surveying, then the vendee purchased the land and in turn sold
it to a third party who executed a mortgage, thereon, the lien was per-
fected as to the owner (the vendee) and to the creditors with notice.
Until notice was filed, however, the lien was not perfected and not valid
as to purchasers and creditors without notice." 7
Boux v. East Hillsborough Apartments Inc."8 held that in cases
where the owner corporation is wholly owned by the contractor, the
corporation will be looked through so that the subcontractor is in privity
with the owner. In this situation the subcontractor does not have to file
notice to the owner.
111. General Cigar Co., Inc. v. Davis, 204 So.2d 227 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
112. Blow v. Colonial Oil Co., 225 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969). The lessor's original
amenability to regrade the property swayed the court so as to find this to be a practical
construction of the intent of the parties.
113. FLA. STAT. § 713.01(16)(17) (1967).
114. 219 So.2d 475 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
115. 193 So.2d 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967), discussed in Boyer, Real Property Law, 22
U. MLxsus L. REv. 278, 295 (1967) (Florida Survey). Judicial prediction is certainly difficult
in this area.
116. FLA. STAT. § 713.54 (1967).
117. Roberts v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 222 So.2d 32 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). The
mortgagee of the property had brought an action to foreclose his lien. The court held that
the mortgagee's lien was superior because he was a creditor without notice.
118. 218 So.2d 202 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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B. Mechanic's Lien-Conditions
1. FURNISHING OF MATERIALS
One of the conditions of obtaining a mechanic's lien under the statute
is to prove the "furnishing of materials.""'  One could furnish materials
by either supplying materials that were incorporated in the improvement
or by specially fabricating materials for incorporation into the improve-
ment. Since it would be an insurmountable burden to prove that every
item of material supplied by the materialman was actually incorporated
into the improvement, section 713.01(6) (formerly section 84.011(6)) of
the Florida Statutes provides that it is sufficient to prove delivery of ma-
terials to the construction site. This is prima facie evidence that they were
incorporated into the improvement. Applying these principles, the court
in Beautyware Plumbing Supply Co. v. Columbiad Apartments, Inc.1
20
held that when the materialman showed that all materials were delivered
to the job site or the plumbing contractor's job site for fabrication, this
was insufficient to furnish prima facie proof of furnishing materials be-
cause the evidence did not show what portion was delivered to the con-
tractor's shop and what portion to the job site. The statute does not
protect a materialman supplying a contractor when he does not show that
the materials were specifically fabricated for incorporation into the im-
provement.
2. NOTICE
Persons not in privity with the owner must file a notice of their
claim. 2' When must the claim be filed and what happens to the prospec-
tive lienor who fails to file within the specified time period? In the prior
biennium, the second district cases of Babe's Plumbing Inc. v. Maier
and Stancil v. Gardner"2 held that notice must be filed by a materialman
within 45 days after the commencing of the furnishing of materials. In
the early part of the biennium, Bard Manufacturing Co. v. Albert &
Jamerson Building Supply Corp.28 followed the second district cases.
In Fine v. Crane Company,24 the third district followed the line of
cases holding that notice must be filed within 45 days and the supreme
court reversed. The supreme court distinguished Babes Plumbing and
Stancil in Crane Co. v. Fine 125 and held that liens not filed within the 45
day period but which were filed could still be asserted, but would be on
119. FLA. STAT. § 713.01(6) (1967).
120. 215 So.2d 42 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
121. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) (1967).
122. 194 So.2d 666 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966) and 192 So.2d 340 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966), dis-
cussed in Boyer, Real Property Law, 22 MIAmi L. REv. 278, 297 (1967) (Florida Survey).
123. 212 So.2d 13 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
124. 211 So.2d 219 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
125. 221 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1969).
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a lower priority than liens filed within 45 days from the commencing of
furnishing materials.
1 26
The notice must, of course, be given to the owner within the
limitations period prescribed for the recording of a Claim of
Lien and, for obvious reasons, before the owner has paid out
(either in a progress or the final payment) that portion of the
sums due under the direct contract to which the lienor would be
entitled. 27
The case also resolved, by conflict certiorari, the question of whether a
materialman who failed to perfect a mechanic's lien was barred from an
equitable lien, discussed infra.
In order to institute suit against the owner, the contractor must file
an affidavit stating that all lienors have been paid in full or listing those
who have not been paid and the amount due. The architect must file the
same affidavit according to Davis Engineering, Inc. v. Purcel.12 Under
the Mechanic's Lien Law, there are three basic categories-contractor,
laborer, and materialman-and an architect is in the first.
29
C. Equitable Liens
The major mechanic's lien question which reverberated among the
appellate courts of this state was whether a materialman who failed to
perfect his mechanic's lien was thereafter precluded from seeking an
equitable lien. The supreme court reviewed the question by conflict
certiorari in Crane Co. v. Fine'3 0 and held one who fails to perfect a
mechanic's lien is not thereafter automatically barred from asserting an
equitable lien if he can show special and particular equities in his favor.
In the Crane case, the materialman had specially fabricated materials for
the plumbing subcontractor who later abandoned the job. At the time
of the abandonment, the general contractor was holding sums due the
subcontractor for labor and materials under a hold-back provision.
Under the circumstances, an equitable lien was held proper.
In sharp contrast, the supreme court ruled that there was no cause
for an equitable lien in Merritt v. Unkefer,'3' reversing the district
court.'3 2 In that case, the plaintiff architect postponed billing when so
requested by the owner of the property who said that he would pay the
architect following a final judgment in a condemnation proceeding. The
126. Id. at 152.
127. Id.
128. 202 So.2d 827 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
129. Id. at 829.
130. 221 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1969). Following the Crane case, the fourth district vacated
its first decision in 1800 North Federal Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Supply Co., 224 So.2d
384 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
131. 223 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1969).
132. Unkefer v. Merritt, 207 So.2d 726 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
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court, one judge dissenting,' held that an equitable lien based on "un-
just enrichment" or a "general consideration of right and justice" has
been in each instance based on mistake or misrepresentation of a material
fact beyond the circumstances of this particular case. 4
D. Sureties
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Robuck,'135 the principal
(contractor) secured a bond from the surety for the construction of a
shopping center based on a forged construction contract. The electrical
and plumbing contractors sued the surety to collect their mechanic's
liens. The court held that the fraud of the principal did not vitiate the
liability of the surety to the mechanic. The fact that the surety bonded
a fictitious contract did not negate its liability because it was the duty
of the surety to discover the true terms of the contract.8
E. Procedure
A general contractor is liable to lien claimants. In Morris & Esner,
Inc. v. Olympia Enterprises, Inc., 37 the court held that a contractor
could include in his complaint for foreclosure amounts owed to lien
claimants who had not filed their own suit, but not those amounts due
to lien claimants who had filed suit. The court pointed out that under
rule 1.270138 the judge could try the lien claimants suits together with
the suit of the contractor. The court also held that only amounts ex-
pended pursuant to the direct contract were claimable.' 9
IV. FIxTURES, PLANTS AND CROPS
A. Legislation
Chapter 69-97 of the 1969 Session Laws amended section 713.02
of the Florida Statutes by providing liens for any person who furnished
trees, shrubs, bushes, or plants on real property and for any person pro-
viding carpets or rugs which are permanently affixed to the building.
B. Case Law
Is wall-to-wall carpeting real or personal property? That answer,
ruled the court in United Bonding Insurance Co. v. Minichiello,4 ° de-
pends on what the parties intend. In that case, it was held a fixture-
133. 223 So.2d at 724 (dissenting opinion).
134. Id. (majority opinion).
135. 203 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
136. Id. at 206-07.
137. 200 So.2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
138. FLA. R. CIv. PRO. 1.2 70.
139. 200 So.2d at 582.
140. 221 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
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the contract provided for the installation of fixtures and carpeting, and
the carpeting was specified as the original floor covering.
In a case arising before the effective date of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code in Florida,14' a mortgagor of real property, after final judg-
ment had been rendered for the mortgagee, executed a crop lien to his
attorney for his fee. Invalidating the lien, the court stated that before
default a chattel mortgage could be given on the existing crops, but not
as to crops which came into being after default. Nor could the mortgagor
give a lien after default, and certainly not in this case where judgment
had been given. 42
V. MORTGAGES
A. Legislation
The Home Improvement Act now requires that when a promissory
note and mortgage are given to finance home improvement construction,
it must state that the note is subject to the terms of a home-improvement
contract. 4 3 This much needed legislation is intended as a stop-gap
measure to prevent such notes from being negotiated to a holder in due
course who is not subject to the defense of failure of consideration.
It was a legislative attempt to put a damper on one of the con man's
favorites-the home improvement game.
B. Foreclosure Sales and Deficiency Decrees
The important question of whether the foreclosure price is conclusive
of the value of the property in a subsequent action at law for the bal-
ance due on the note was certified to the supreme court in Fulton v.
R. K. Cooper Construction Company.144 In that case, the note was
$19,500 and the price paid at the foreclosure sale was $10. The supreme
court held in a three-to-three decision that the price paid was not con-
clusive of the value of the property, even though no objection had been
made to the sale within the 10-day period.145 The court reasoned that
the alternative sale chapter providing for 10 days in which to make an
objection so the chancellor may set aside the sale does not determine the
value of the property for subsequent actions at law but is only conclu-
sive as to sufficient consideration to support the transfer of title. 46
141. Bryan v. First National Bank, 217 So.2d 129 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968). The Code went
into effect on January 1, 1967.
142. Id. at 131-32.
143. Fla. Laws, 1969, ch. 69-44. This will be FLA. STAT. § 520.80 (1969).
144. 208 So.2d 863 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967). The court did not hold that the price was not
conclusive based on the holding of the second district case of Bobby Jones Garden Apart-
ments, Inc. v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 202 So.2d 226 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) which
had so ruled on the same question.
145. FLA. STAT. § 702.02(5) (1967).
146. R. K. Cooper Construction Co. v. Fulton, 216 So.2d 11, 13 (Fla. 1968).
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Klondike, Inc. v. Blair147 ruled that the mortgagee's bringing of an
action at law on the note did not bar a subsequent suit in equity to
foreclose the mortgage, nor amount to an abandonment of the security
interest, when there was no satisfaction or payment. The action did not
amount to an election of remedies since they were not inconsistent, and
no satisfaction was received. 4 8
The mortgage foreclosure is a different concept in Florida under the
"lien theory" than it was at common law when title passed to the
mortgagee and the principles of foreclosure were very strict. Foreclo-
sure in Florida is an equitable remedy. Thus, the appellate court in
Watson v. Vafides' 49 approved the lower court's action in refusing to
confirm a sale and in ordering a resale. The mortgagor bid the highest
price for his land ($50,000) and was then unable to come up with the
money. The next bidder at $41,000 was the judgment creditor of the
mortgagor, but when the property was offered for sale after the mort-
gagor failed to pay, he secured the land for $30,000. The court held
that resales should be made on the spot before bidders disperse and had
the resale been made immediately, the clerk should have started at the
next highest bid."5
C. Consideration
In Contractors Construction Corp. v. Michael Development Corp.,'5'
the mortgagor was in substantial default. Michael, holder of the second
mortgage, obtained the first mortgagee's signature on a subordination
agreement, reciting it was in consideration of ten dollars and other good
and valuable considerations. Michael told the first mortgagee that if
he did not agree to subordinate, Michael would foreclose. The majority
of the court upheld the forbearance of the first mortgagee as consider-
ation for the agreement.' 52 The dissent, after dismissing the recital as
consideration, vigorously argued that forbearance was not the consid-
eration since it was not shown to have been bargained for by the first
mortgagee.15 3 The dissenting judge also apparently believed that there
was a failure of consideration.154 Indeed, it is not readily apparent why
a holder of a prior mortgage would be particularly concerned about the
foreclosure of a junior mortgage, and why he would subordinate just to
prevent foreclosure of the junior.
147. 211 So.2d 41 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
148. Id. at 43.
149. 212 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
150. Id. at 362.
151. 213 So.2d 430 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
152. Id.
133. Id. at 431 (Cross, J. dissenting).
154. Id. at 434-35.
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D. Clogging
The common-law rule against clogging was designed to prevent the
mortgagee from impairing the mortgagor's equity of redemption. Thus,
the mortgagee could not cut-off the mortgagor's equity of redemption
by obtaining from the mortgagor a contemporaneous deed of fee simple
absolute which could be recorded on default.
The rule against clogging may have been weakened by the case of
MacArthur v. North Palm Beach Utilities, Inc. 5' The mortgagor pur-
chased land from the mortgagee and at the same time executed a mort-
gage on the water and sewer system to be constructed by proceeds
advanced by the seller-mortgagee. A contemporaneous agreement under
seal gave the mortgagee the option to repurchase the sewer and water
system at cost. The chancellor and the appellate court both denied the
mortgagee the right to exercise the option, based on the doctrine of
clogging.5 6
The majority of the supreme court held that clogging did not apply
because the option was a part of the original sale and financing arrange-
ment; the mortgagor in effect purchased, subject to an option, that part
of the land so affected and such land remained subject to an option. 57
The convincing dissent argued that clogging did apply because the
mortgage was taken to construct a sewer system and the option was to
buy back at cost the very property the mortgage was taken to finance. 58
E. Acceleration
Prepayments were made by the mortgagor which exceeded the
amount of periodic payments due. The second district held that this
prevented an acceleration of payments and a foreclosure which was
based solely on the failure to make payments. 59 The holding was based
on the maxim "He who seeks equity, must do equity."
The acceleration provisions of a mortgage may possibly result in
usury, but the test of usury is what actually happens. Thus, when the
mortgagor defaulted twice on payments and later made them up and
the mortgagee delayed any action and acceleration until the third de-
fault, the fact that acceleration would have been usurious if the mort-
gagee had acted earlier did not matter.'
155. 202 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1967).
156. 187 So.2d 681 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966), discussed in Boyer, Real Property Law, 22
U. MiAx L. Rlv. 278, 308-09 (1967) (Florida survey).
157. 202 So.2d at 186.
158. Id. at 187 (dissenting opinion).
159. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Pringle, 216 So.2d 468 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
160. Green Ridge Corp. v. South Jersey Mtg. Co., 211 So.2d 70 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
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F. Attorney's Fees
A mortgage contained the provision that the mortgagor would pay
to the mortgagee "all cost .. . including reasonable attorney's fees"
which the mortgagee might incur "collecting any sum secured, whether
by foreclosure or otherwise."'' The fourth district held that such a




In D.A.D., Inc. v. Moring,68 one of two joint tenants procured a
mortgage and recorded the deed and mortgage without the knowledge
of the other joint tenant. The mortgagee began foreclosure proceedings,
but the mortgagor-cotenant died before the cause came to issue. The
court held that the mortgage was no longer enforceable because of the
right of survivorship. The contention that the mortgage should still be
enforceable against the undivided one-half interest of the dead joint ten-
ant (which went to the surviving joint tenant) was rejected.' Since
the mortgage was a lien and not a transfer of title, the unities were not
destroyed when the mortgage was executed.
The grantor sued for reformation of a deed given as a security
device, claiming it was a mortgage. The trial court held that the deed was
a deed absolute, but ordered the plaintiff grantor to pay the defendant
because a debt still existed." 5 The appellate court reversed the trial
court holding that if the debt still existed; such a result would be an
anomaly. The grantor, having divested himself of the property by a deed
absolute, should not still be obligated to pay a substantial part of the
purchase price.
Where a utility owning easement rights was not made a party to a
foreclosure, but the utility agreement was attached to the complaint,
the utility was not an unknown claimant. Therefore, service of process
by publication was insufficient, and the utility's rights were not extin-
guished by the foreclosure. 166
VI. CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES
These hybrids of property and corporation concepts, instant com-
mercial successes in the housing starved Southeast Gold Coast, are slowly
emerging as something short of universal panaceas and as not entirely
161. Empress Homes, Inc. v. Levin, 201 So.2d 475 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
162. Id.
163. 218 So.2d 451 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
164. Of course, it did not apply to the interest of the tenant who did not know of the
mortgage.
165. O'Neal v. MacNeill, 216 So.2d 465 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
166. Consolidated Utility Services, Inc. v. Indian Lake Properties, Inc. 217 So.2d 137
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
REAL PROPERTY
unmixed blessings. An objective appraisal of life in these predominantly
vertical subdivisions becomes increasingly feasible as experiences mul-
tiply. Although undoubtedly many controversies concerning such things
as occupancy control, regulations of common facilities, and the regularity
of association proceedings, never reach the litigation stage; some litiga-
tion has already proceeded through the appellate levels. These cases
will be discussed, but first, it is noted again that the owners of these
units used for residential purposes may now qualify for the homestead
taxation exemption on their individual units.16
In Fountainview Association, Inc. No. 4 v. Bell,16 the condominium
associations were formed by the defendant promoters who were their
sole officers, directors, and members. The promoters then sold and leased
lands to the associations and entered into management contracts at ex-
orbitant prices and fees. Thereafter, the purchasers of the condominium
units were let into the associations and the promoters left, retaining, of
course, the benefits of those transactions previously entered into with
the associations. The associations then brought suit to obtain relief from
these contracts, arguing that the promoters had the same fiduciary duties
as other corporate officers and directors. The district court agreed that
the condominium officers had the duties of corporate officers because
the condominium association could have been formed as a corporation
for profit. However, the court concluded that there was no breach of this
duty,6" and the supreme court affirmed without an opinion. 7' Justice
Ervin, in a long and vigorous dissent, discussed the corporate fiduciary
protection afforded stockholders and thought that the same principle
should apply to what he regarded as an obvious breach of trust.'
Another condominium scheme was upheld in Wechsler v. Goldman. "'
The individual owners of several condominiums leased the recreation
area in their apartment building from the developers at exorbitant prices.
The court held that the owners could not cancel the lease and the asso-
ciation could not reform it by stating:
It is not without some reluctance that we hold the plaintiff
condominium associations do not have a cause for relief against
the claimed exorbitant lease rental obligation imposed on them
while both lessor and lessee were owned or controlled by the
167. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
168. 203 So.2d 657, aff'd, 214 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1968).
169. The court merely cited Lake Mabel Devel. Corp. v. Bird, 99 Fla. 253, 126 So.
356 (1930), to hold that this scheme did not breach a duty to subsequent stockholders.
170. 214 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1968).
171. Id. (dissenting opinion). The justice distinguished the Lake Mabel case by arguing
that in that case no stock was ever shown to have been sold to the public. Id. at 611. The
justice is right. In Lake Mabel, the corporation tried to avoid the sales by its organizer
when the mortgagee sued the corporation. The court said that the rights of innocent stock-
holders had not arisen when the exorbitant sale was made. It does not discuss what these
rights would be if the stock were later sold publicly.
172. 214 So.2d 741 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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promoters. However, we affirm the decree on the authority of
Fountainview [discussed above] . . . which, on review by the
Supreme Court of Florida, recently was held to have been cor-
rectly decided .... What occurred in this instance and in the
Fountainview case may indicate a need for legislative
171action ....
Cooperative apartments also may have their disappointed holders of
castles in the sky. In Hirlinger v. Stelzer,174 the developers leased co-
operative apartments to the plaintiffs. The sales talk involved reference
to a reproduction of the project called the "master plat." This plat showed
a recreation area, but apparently none was provided for in the lease.
The lease did make reference, however, to "appurtenances" and a "plat."
The court held that, assuming the plat, the lessees had a cause of action
for an implied easement; but it also indicated that the cooperators may
have a problem of proof. The court said that the plat was necessary to
support an action for an implied easement, but that the lessees had no
cause of action as such which would enable them to compel production
of the "master plat." The dilemma is apparent-without the plat there
is no cause of action, and without a cause of action, no production of
the plat can be compelled. It is somewhat reminiscent of the proverbial
problem of the chicken and egg. In all probability, however, the decision
simply means that the complaint was inartfully drawn and that there was
no justification for a separate "count" seeking the production and main-




The provision in the new constitution encompassing the power of
eminent domain is article ten, section six. The new provision is a com-
bination of the eminent-domain and drainage provisions of the old con-
stitution. 7' The language is somewhat different, and there is no special
provision in the article itself for the right to jury trial as there was in
article XVI, section 29 of the repealed constitution. Further, the use
of a single constitutional provision eliminates any former ambiguity as
to the difference, if any, between "full" and "just" compensation. The
new provision uses the term "full compensation."
The Community Redevelopment Act,17 7 discussed infra, provides
173. Id. at 744.
174. 222 So.2d 237 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
175. See 222 So.2d 237 at 238, "On Petition for Rehearing."
176. FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights § 12, art. 16, §§ 28, 29 (1885). Section 12 of the
Declaration of Rights, apparently applying to governmental takings, used the term "just
compensation" as did article XVI, section 28. Article XVI, section 29, applying to takings
by corporations or individuals with the power of eminent domain, used the term "full
compensation."
177. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 6W309, 1 10 at 1078.
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for the use of eminent domain to redevelop slum or blighted areas.
The legislature also gave the power of eminent domain to the boards
of trustees of junior colleges whenever the State Board of Education
finds it necessary.
178
Venue for causes of action with the State Road Department was
statutorily laid in Leon County, or the county where the cause of action
accrued. 79
B. Interests That Are Protected
1. MORTGAGEE'S INTEREST
Florida's lien theory of mortgage means that the mortgagee has no
estate in land. The question is, then, does the mortgagee have standing
to challenge an eminent-domain award given the mortgagor? The third
district in Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Dade
County held that unless the award is so inadequate as to impair the
mortgagee's security interest, he has no standing.8 0
2. OPTION TO RENEW LEASE
A lessee who operated a drive-in theatre on his leasehold had an
option of renewal for an additional 5-year term at reasonable rates. This
option was held to be an interest in land such as to support a compen-
sation award in an eminent-domain proceeding in State Road Depart-
ment v. Tampa Bay Theaters.'' Damages should be awarded thereon
only if the lessee would have exercised the option had the condemnation
proceedings not been pending.
8 2
C. Business Damages and Other Items of Recovery
The second district considered two cases dealing with a taking
resulting in a total destruction of a business, one of which was reversed
by the supreme court. Florida Statutes section 73.071(3) (b) provides
for business damages. The compensation takes into account,
Where less than the entire property is sought to be appropriated,
any damages to the remainder caused by the taking, including
when ... the effect of the taking of the property involved may
damage or destroy an established business of more than five
years standing ... located upon adjoining lands owned or held
by such party [the one whose land is being taken], the probable
damages to such business . . .18
178. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-123, adding FLA. STAT. § 230.0103(f) (1969).
179. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-391.
180. 221 So.2d 790 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
181. 208 So.2d 485 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
182. Id. at 487.
183. FiA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1967).
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In Douglass v. Hillsborough County,8 4 the sublessee appealed a
decision refusing to allow him any recovery for business damages when
his entire leasehold property was condemned. The second district ruled
that the sublessee was not entitled to business damage because the
destroyed business was located on the property taken, not adjoining it.
Young v. Hillsborough County,5 5 decided by the second district at the
same time as Douglass, involved a partial taking where the entire busi-
ness was destroyed because land taken passed through the front portion
of defendant's building. The court reasoned that since the entire business
was destroyed and the value of the land taken was enhanced by the
operation of the business thereon, there should be no distinction between
a partial taking and a total taking when the business was destroyed.""
Therefore, business damages would not be awarded. The supreme court
disagreed, however, and held that the distinction was clearly made in
the statute, and the owner of the business was entitled to business dam-
ages.1
8 7
This same statutory provision presented another interesting question
in Glessner v. Duval County. 8 The appellant had a perpetual easement
over the land of another which was taken in an eminent-domain pro-
ceeding. This easement provided ingress and egress to the appellant's
truck manufacturing business and was the only access over which semi-
trailer trucks could pass, although the appellant did have other means
of ingress and egress. The first district ruled that the appellant could
recover business damages to the business on the land adjoining his per-
petual easement. This is a liberal interpretation of the statute, 89 much
different from the strict construction of the second district. 9° The court
also held that the appellant was entitled to severance damages. 1
State Road Department v. Myers'92 held that a tenant on a month-
to-month basis could not recover damages for moving personal property
from the portion of the leasehold which was not actually taken in an
eminent-domain proceeding. The court emphasized that since the per-
sonal property was not on the part of the land being taken, it was not
absolutely necessary for the appellants to relocate their business.
184. 206 So.2d 402 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968). Accord, Glessner v. Duval County, 203 So.2d
330 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
185. 206 So.2d 405 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
186. Id. at 401.
187. 215 So.2d 300 (Fla. 1968).
188. 203 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
189. Note that the statute provides for damages to the "party whose land is being
taken," to a business located upon adjoining lands. FLA. STAT. § 73.077(3)(b) (1967)
(emphasis supplied). The statute refers to the owner of lands, not property.
190. See notes 173-76 supra and accompanying text.
191. Id. at 334.
192. 211 So.2d 33 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1968).
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D. Public Use and Necessities of Taking
In City of Palm Bay v. General Development Utilities, Inc.,9 3 the
city sought to exercise its eminent domain power in order to acquire the
defendant utility's water and sewer system, all of which was located
within the city limits. The appellate court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that the eminent-domain statutes 94 did not provide for the taking
of an existing utility, but only land upon which to build a utility. The
court then proceeded to discuss the primary argument: the doctrine of
prior public use prohibits the taking of an existing privately owned utility
already dedicated to public use without clear and specific statutory au-
thority. The court stated that although the taking of the property was
for the same public use, the larger public use and more general public
benefit resulting from the operation of a public utility by a municipality
warranted such a taking.
195
Land taken for the expansion of the University of Miami Medical
School was the subject of an eminent-domain dispute in Wright v. Dade
County. 98 The lands taken were planned for the construction of clinical
research and teaching facilities, but plans for construction had not been
prepared nor was the exact use of the appellant owner's land stated.
The court held that the necessity of taking and the amount of land
reasonably needed for anticipated expansion were matters for the dis-
cretion of county officials. In these circumstances, it was not necessary
for the officials to make immediate use of the property, or to have plans
and specifications prepared. 97
E. Inverse Condemnation
The "taking" of property by the noisy use of the airways through
inverse condemnation was established in Florida by the case of City of
Jacksonville v. Schumann.198 The more recent case of Northcutt v. State
Road Department'99 refused to extend inverse condemnation to property
damages by noise from the highways. The court stated that there was a
substantial difference in the noise, safety, and use of actors of highways
vis-a-vis airways. To sustain the cause of action, the court reasoned,
193. 201 So.2d 912 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
194. FLA. STAT. §§ 180.06, .22 (1967).
195. 201 So.2d at 916 citing 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 75 (1965).
196. 216 So.2d 494 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), cert. denied, 225 So.2d 527 (Fla. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1969).
197. Id. at 496-97.
198. 167 So.2d 95 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964), cert. denied, 172 So.2d 597 (1965), cert. denied
390 U.S. 981 (1968). This first appeal was an interlocutory one. The cases were up on
appeal again after trial. After a discussion of the trial judge's evaluation of the evidence,
the case was affirmed. 199 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
199. 209 So.2d 710 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
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"would bring to an effective halt the construction, operation and main-
tenance of access roads and highways within the State of Florida.
20 0
Hillsborough County Aviation Authority v. Benitez2"' resolved
several issues in a cause of action for an aviational easement. The
plaintiffs lived near the airport and were directly in line with the take-
off of the airplanes. Noise from the airplanes had affected them adversely
in several ways (interruption of sleep and conversation, nervousness).
The court held that the character of the invasion deprived the plaintiffs
of enjoyment and use of their property and damage was substantial;
therefore, there was a taking. 0 2 There was no prescriptive right to an
easement on the part of the airport authority. The period for prescription
of an aviational easement begins to run from the time that there first
is a substantial interference with the owner's use and enjoyment of his
land.2
03
Kendry v. State Road Department20 4 was a rather unusual case on
its facts. Plaintiffs were the owners of land over which the defendant
road department had taken a perpetual easement by eminent domain.
The easement, however, contained a restriction: that the new fill and
roadbed would not be any higher than the present highway. The widening
of the highway, however, resulted in an elevation and drainage on the
plaintiff's land which caused damage and made the property useless for
residential purposes. The defendant also filled in bottom land in a stream
adjacent to the plaintiff's land. The court held: 1) the additional bur-
den imposed on the servient estate by violation of the easement restric-
tion was a taking; 2) the drainage damage to the land was a taking if
the flooding damage was permanent; and 3) the filled-in land in streams
adjacent to the plaintiff's land belonged to the plaintiff and the defen-
dant's use of them constituted a taking.20 5 There was a strong and
vigorous dissent arguing that damages from the elevation of a highway
were not compensable and this was a technical violation of a restriction
in the easement which is not a taking.0
F. Procedure
The State Road Department appealed a judgment awarding dam-
ages by the eminent-domain taking of a leasehold only as to the award
to one tenant, paying the cotenant and fee owner. The case, State Road
Department v. Hartsfield,20 held that since the appellant accepted the
benefits of the judgment (by two of the parties), he could not appeal
200. Id. at 711.
201. 200 So.2d 194 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
202. Id. at 199.
203. Id. at 200.
204. 213 So.2d 23 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968), cert. denied, 222 So.2d 752 (Fla. 1969).
205. Id. at 26-28.
206. Id. at 28 (Cross, J. dissenting).
207. 216 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
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it. The court pointed out that in the eminent-domain action the jury
renders a verdict fixing a compensation to be paid for the entire parcel,
208
and the judge determines the rights of the parties involved in the appor-
tionment of the award.2 9 Therefore, although the judgment looks sep-
arate and divisible, it really is not. Retrial as to one party would require
retrial as to all.
G. Miscellaneous
In Di Virgilio v. State Road Department,21 ° the defendant owner's
land lay on both sides of an already existing highway. The property was
condemned as one parcel, and the defendant did not object to such treat-
ment until the motion for new trial was made. The appellate court held
that the defendant could not now complain of single-parcel treatment
of his land. Contiguity of parcels is not the only test for one parcel.
Three facts are important: unity of ownership, unity of use, and physical
contiguity. If lands are only nominally divided, they will be treated as
a single unit.
211
VIII. ZONING AND URBAN RENEWAL
A. Legislation
Two major legislative enactments, one aimed at correction of existing
problems in land usage, the Community Redevelopment Act,21 2 the other
aimed at enabling the municipalities to more carefully plan their future
development,218 were passed by the 1969 legislature.
The act providing for the future development of municipalities is
a far more comprehensive piece of enabling legislation for zoning pur-
poses than chapter 176 of the Florida Statutes. The act is supplementary
to already existing zoning provisions. It establishes a commission for
development which is to adopt a comprehensive plan, after a public hear-
ing, effective upon adoption by the governing body.214 At least once a
year, the plan is to be reviewed by the planning commission to determine
if any changes or additions are necessary.2 15 The plans must be for the
purpose of "guiding and accomplishing coordinated, adjusted and harmo-
nious development in accordance with existing and future needs, and in
order to protect, promote and improve public health, safety, comfort,
order, appearance, convenience, morals, and general welfare. 2 16 Detailed
208. FLA. STAT. § 73.081 (1967).
209. FLA. STAT. § 73.101 (1967).
210. 205 So.2d 317 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967), cert. discharged, 211 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1968).
211. Id.
212. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-305.
213. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-139.
214. Id. at §§ 5-7.
215. Id. at § 9.
216. Id. at § 10.
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provisions may be made for such items as height, stones, bulk, location,
erection, repair, and density of population.2 17 Proposed changes in the
regulation may be suggested by the commission, governing body, 1 or
51 percent or more of the area involved in the change. The board of
adjustment shall be created by the governing body,2 19 to handle appeals,
to decide such exceptions as authorized under the zoning ordinance, and
to grant variances.220 Persons aggrieved after the decision of the board
of adjustment may then apply to the circuit court for trial de novo or
review by certiorari.221 A violation of the act or a zoning ordinance is a
misdemeanor.122 The municipalities are authorized to regulate the sub-
division of lands228 and in areas where a commission is established, the
governing body may designate the commission as an accredited repre-
sentative for approving subdivisions, plans, and plats under chapter 177
of the Florida Statutes.224 The general act may be summed up as a piece
of homerule enabling legislation.225
The Community Redevelopment Act was passed for the purposes
of clearing slums and blighted areas, renewal that may be urban, sub-
urban, or rural. Under the power of eminent domain, discussed supra,
the agency may acquire slums or any blighted portion thereof, real
property to be repaired or rehabilitated, or any property to eliminate
unsanitary conditions.
It is hoped that the spirit of these two acts, to provide and preserve
clean, aesthetic, healthful, and sanitary communities for Florida living,
226
will be carried out to preserve Florida from the afflictions of northern
communities.
Chapter 69-119 of the Florida Laws of 1969 provides for minimum
standards of notice for zoning changes. It must be mailed to the owner's
current address no later than 10 days before the hearing.
B. Scope of The Power
1. THE FAIRLY DEBATABLE RULE
The very debatable "fairly debatable rule" was more than viable
this biennium, 2s7 it was alive and kicking.2 28 The efficacy of the rule in
217. Id.
218. Id. at § 12.
219. Id. at § 13.
220. Id. at § 14.
221. Id. at § 19.
222. Id. at § 20.
223. Id. at § 21.
224. Id. at § 22.
225. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-305.
226. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-305 § 9.
227. See Boyer, Real Property Law, 22 MiAmI L. REv. 278, 313 (1967) (Florida
survey).
228. The following cases applied the fairly debatable rule: City of St. Petersburg v.
Aikin, 217 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1968); Metropolitan Dade County v. Greenlee, 224 So.2d 781
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1969); Watson v. Mayflower Property, Inc., 223 So.2d 368 (Fla. 4th Dist.
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upholding zoning ordinances was strengthened by the supreme court
decision of City of St. Petersburg v. Aiken.2
In the two previous surveys of real property law, it was pointed
out that the effect of the case of Burritt v. Harris 230 was probably ex-
aggerated by the second district decision of Lawley v. Town of Golf-
view"' which read Burritt as casting the burden on the zoning authorities
of establishing that an ordinance bears substantially on the public health,
morals, safety, or welfare of the community.2 2 This conclusion was borne
out by the supreme court case of City of St. Petersburg v. Aiken,"' which
resolved the question. The court held that the burden of proof was on the
person attacking the ordinance. "[T]he fairly debatable doctrine is now
restored.... 2
Two cases dealing with the requirement that gasoline stations be
separated by certain minimum distances came to opposite results under
the fairly debatable rule, perhaps due to the fact that both decisions
upheld the decision of the chancellor. In City of Boca Raton v. Trade-
wind Hills, Inc.,23 5 the court upheld the spacing ordinance. City of Miami
v. Wysong20 held that the ordinance was invalid. The plaintiff supported
the burden of proof of the ordinance's invalidity because the defendant
city introduced no testimony as to what distance was a safe one while
the plaintiff showed that there was no reasonable necessity for the dis-
tance insofar as their property was concerned. 87
2. IS IT ARBITRARY AND CONFISCATORY?
A zoning regulation for business edifices (which had the effect of
preventing the erection of a Farm Store which was below the minimum
height) was held invalid in City of North Miami v. Newsome.2 3 1 "Zoning
1969); County of Brevard v. Woodham, 223 So.2d 344 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969); Town of
N. Redington Beach v. Williams, 220 So.2d 22 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969); City of Miami v.
Wysong, 217 So.2d 603 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) (gas station distance requirement not fairly
debatable since no evidence was presented on this point); City of Boca Raton v. Trade-
wind Hills, Inc., 216 So.2d 460 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968); McCormick v. City of Pensacola, 216
So.2d 785 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968); Donach v. City of Miami, 214 So.2d 503 (Fla. 3d Dist
1968); Smith v. City of Miami Beach, 213 So.2d 281 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); Pepper v.
Dade County, 209 So.2d 684 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); Metropolitan Dade County v. Kanter,
200 So.2d 624 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
229. 217 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1968), rev'g, 208 So.2d 26$ (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
230. 172 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1965).
231. 174 So.2d 767 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
232. Boyer, Real Property Law, 22 U. Mi.emi L. REv. 278, 313 (1967) (Florida sur-
vey); Boyer, Real Property Law, 20 U. MiAmS L. Rav. 313, 339-41 (1965) (Florida sur-
vey).
233. 217 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1968), rev'g, 208 So.2d 268 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
234. McCormick v. City of Pensacola, 216 So.2d 785, 789 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968) (com-
menting on the St. Petersburg case). See this case for a development of the circuitous path
which this doctrine took during the last 4 years.
235. 216 So.2d 460 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
236. 217 So.2d 603 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
237. Id. at 605. Tradewind Hills indicated a conflict of testimony on the need for the
ordinance. 216 So.2d at 461.
238. 203 So.2d 634 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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requirements specifying a minimum height for business buildings have
uniformly been held invalid, as arbitrary, unreasonable and having no
relation to public health safety and welfare.128 9
Ordinances requiring the screening of junk yards are valid according
to the court in Rotenberg v. City of Fort Pierce.2 40 The court reaffirmed
the principle that the regulation of occupations injurious to the "public
health, morals, comfort, prosperity or convenience or otherwise detri-
mental to the general welfare" is a proper exercise of the power, and
aesthetics is a valid basis for regulation.24'
3. EFFECT OF A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES
In Smith v. City of Miami Beach,242 the trial judge refused to relax
a zoning ordinance with the exception of one piece of property. The
owner of this property had alleged a change in circumstances because a
parking lot had been erected across the street and immediately south of
his property. The appellate court pointed out that if a change to multiple
family zoning were allowed as to this one piece of property, it would
have a domino effect, toppling the residential district. The court reversed
the relief as to the one plaintiff, denying a charge in zoning to all plain-
tiffs.
A zoning ordinance, zoning a residential area, was struck down as
unreasonable due to a change in circumstances in Kugel v. City of Miami
Beach.248 The City of Miami Beach Convention Hall had been built
across the street from the plaintiff's property and the street had become
a major thoroughfare.
C. Enabling Acts
The City of Palm Beach and the zoning commission brought an
action against a trailer park for failure to comply with the county's
building, plumbing, and electrical code. Defendant attacked the codes
as not being authorized by the enabling legislation. The special act244
gave Palm Beach the authority to zone lands in the unincorporated areas
of the county and to adopt building, plumbing, and electrical codes. The
appellant argued that no guidelines for the codes were prescribed and
the provision for codes was a mere afterthought. The supreme court
held in that case, Demko's Gold Coast Trailer Park v. Palm Beach
County,2 " that the enabling act authorized the codes. The land-use
239. Id. at 636.
240. 202 So.2d 782 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
241. Id. at 785.
242. 213 So.2d 281 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
243. 206 So.2d 282 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), cert. denied, 212 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969), followed by Manilow v. City of Miami Beach, 21.3 So.2d 589
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), aff'd, 226 So.2d 805 (Fla. 1969) (similar facts).
244. Fla. Laws 1957, ch 57-1691.
245. 218 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1969).
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zoning authority was related sufficiently to building construction to war-
rant inclusion in the same act.
D. Procedure
1. MANDAMUS
A person filing suit for mandamus to compel the issuance of a zoning
permit is governed by the law (ordinances) in effect at the time that the
suit is filed, not at the time that the application is filed.246 The same case
held that when suit was filed 10 days after the hearing, not giving the
commission sufficient time to consider its decision before being compelled
by judicial fiat to act, there was a failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. 47
It is error for a trial judge to direct rezoning in a certain fashion. 48
A trial judge who invalidates a zoning classification as too restrictive
should order a less restrictive classification, not reclassify the property.2 49
2. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
In the case of Ryals v. Rich,25° the fourth district invalidated the
Orange County zoning provision, amended by chapter 63-1716 of Florida
Session Laws of 1963, as unconstitutional. The provision said that upon
violation "the court shall ...have the duty to forthwith issue such
temporary and permanent injunctions as are necessary to prevent viola-
tion ... . 251 The court held that the provision was an unconstitutional
usurpation of judicial power. The supreme court reversed, construing
"shall" to mean "may" in the interest of preserving the constitutionality
of the statute.25 2
In Pinellas County v. Hooker,258 the Second District Court of Ap-
peal held that the county could sue in equity for an injunction restraining
the violation of a zoning ordinance without proving a public nuisance. The
court rejected the defendant's argument that the county should be re-
stricted solely to the criminal actions. (Violations were declared a mis-
demeanor in the enabling legislation.2 54)
The special enabling legislation of Orange County provides for an in-
junction against "any person" violating zoning ordinances (typical of
enabling legislation), thus providing an action in personam. Therefore,
246. City of Coral Gables v. Sakolsky, 215 So.2d 329 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
247. Id. at 334.
248. City of Miami Beach v. Weiss, 217 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1969), followed by City of
So. Miami v. Martin Bros., Inc., 222 So.2d 775 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
249. Prestige Homes of Tampa, Inc. v. County of Hillsborough, 220 So.2d 427 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1969).
250. 202 So.2d 779. (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
251. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-1716, § 19.
252. Rich v. Ryals, 212 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1968).
253. 200 So.2d 560 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
254. Fla. Laws 1965, ch 65-2102 § 3.
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the court in Cooper v. Gibson255 held that injunctive relief could not
be granted on constructive services of process.
3. CERTIORARI
A variance was granted by the Zoning Board of Appeals of West
Palm Beach County. Petitioners opposed the variance and filed a writ of
certiorari to the circuit court. The zoning board, but not the city, was
named as respondent in the petition. Service of process was made on the
chairman of the zoning board. The Fourth District Court of Appeal
held that the city was not required to be named as a respondent and had
no standing to file a motion to dismiss. The court also held that service of
process on the chairman of the zoning board was sufficient.256 Justice
Cross dissented, arguing that in view of the nature and scope of zoning, a
police power which can be delegated by the municipality to the zoning
board for administration, the city was a necessary and proper party.257
IX. VENDOR AND PURCHASER
A. Fraud and Misrepresentation-Acquiescence
The vendee who has been defrauded should assert his rights without
delay, otherwise he waives his right to rescind. Thus, where the pur-
chaser became aware of the vendor's fraudulent representations as to
the sale of orange groves but thereafter demanded the deed and executed
a note and mortgage for an additional tract of ground, the purchasers
acquiesced in the fraud and could not assert it as a defense.258
B. Marketable Record Title Act
Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc.25 held that the Marketable Title Act
operated to give good title to one whose root of title had been derived
from a void deed. The court made it clear that the exemption from the
Marketable Title Act of "Estates or interests, easements and use restric-
tions disclosed by and defects inherent in the muniments of title on which
such estate is based beginning with the root of title. . . .' [applied only
to links subsequent to and including the root of title itself.]261 The title in
255. 208 So.2d 117 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
256. Weber v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 206 So.2d 258 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
257. Id. at 262 (dissenting opinion).
258. Tonkovich v. South Florida Citrus Industries, Inc., 202 So.2d 579 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1967). The case had previously been decided on the issue of whether there was fraud in
185 So.2d 710 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966) and certiorari was granted by the supreme court, which
remanded the cause for a consideration of waiver, 196 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1967). See Boyer,
Real Property Law, 22 MiAmi L. REV. 278, 282 (1967) (Florida survey).
259. 224 So.2d 743 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969). The decision was to be certified to the
Supreme Court of Florida as a matter of great public interest.
260. FLA. STAT. § 712.03(1) (1967) as quoted in 224 So.2d at 751 (emphasis supplied).
261. 224 So.2d at 751. The court accepted the statement to that effect by Professor
Barnett that Florida and Indiana made this point clear. See Barnett, Marketable Title Acts
-Panacea or Pandemonium, 53 CoPs Rx= L.Q. 45, 67 (1967).
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this case was derived from a fraudulent conveyance in 1924 by one
purporting to be the president of the grantor corporation, after the testa-
tor (actual president of the corporation and majority stockholder) had
died. The testator's administrator did not discover the fraud until 1966
when he brought suit. The plaintiff may have had the equities on his
side, but not the law. The court dismissed the argument that the Market-
able Title Act applied only to actually vested interests, not to apparently
vested interests .2 2 The language of the statutes' exceptions, unlike
statutes in other states, was a clear indication that it did not apply to
defects prior to the root of title.
2 3
The first district applied the Marketable Title Act in a similar fashion
in Whaley v. Wotring.264 Unlike the statute of limitations which does not
protect the rights of those claiming under a void deed, the Marketable
Title Act bars any claims after 30 years from the root of title against
those claiming under the root, irrespective of what the prior transactions
were. 
2 65
In the Whaley case, although one claimant may have had a better
paper title than the other claimant in possession, he was barred from
asserting the claim because the possessor had a record title whose chain
traced back over 30 years.
In 1961 and 1962, Whaley obtained quitclaim deeds to the property
in question from the heirs of the record holder of title under a 1908 deed.
The 1908 deed referred to a previous deed giving Whaley a chain of title
from 1863 to date. Wotring was claiming title on the basis of quitclaim
deeds from the heirs of one who received an 1897 government patent,
based on a certificate issued in 1851. Wotring filed the quitclaim deeds of
the patentee's heirs in 1966. The jury found that Wotring held the better
paper title. The appellate court, however, held for Whaley, saying that
the 1908 deed had been of record for more than 30 years and the paten-
tee's heirs had until July 1, 1965 to file a notice which would have pro-
tected their claim for another 30 years. In the absence of that notice, the
filing of the quitclaim deeds by Wotring in 1966 came too late to assert
the interest of the patentee's heirs. Thus, in this case, the older competing
chain of title prevailed when the most recent instrument of the junior
chain was recorded more than 30 years after the previous link in that
chain while the senior chain had links filed in 1961 and 1962.
Wilson v. Kelly,"'6 held that a quitclaim deed (in this case of an
undivided one-half interest) could not be a root of title since it did not
purport to convey any particular estate. The court in dictum construed
the act liberally, gave it full effect, and asserted that a wild deed could be
a root of title.
262. The argument, of course, would render the act a nullity in some respects.
263. See note 261 supra.
264. 225 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
265. Id. at 181-82.
266. 226 So.2d 123 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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C. Specific Performance
The fact that the terms of a contract to transfer an interest in real
property are complex will not preclude specific performance.2 7 The pro-
visions of the contract, however,
as to the time for performance, the method of making and
securing deferred payments and the nature and extent of
subordination thereof when provided for, as well as the obliga-
tions of the parties with respect to conditions of the contract
and actions to be taken by the parties should be clear, definite
and certain. 268
Thus, in Lasseter v. Dauer,6 9 the court denied specific performance when
there was a contradiction as to the time of closing; there was no direct,
but only an indirect reference to a mortgage by stating it would be sub-
ordinated to additional financing without more clarification; and there
was no provision as to who had to obtain the requisite zoning change.
D. Merger of Contract Into Deed: Exception
The seller and the buyer entered into a deposit-receipt agreement
whereby the consideration for the agreement was to be two mortgages
and the remainder of the purchase price of the property in shares of
stock. After the closing, the buyer refused to deliver the stock and the
seller sued on the deposit-receipt agreement.
The issue before the appellate court was whether the deposit-receipt
agreement was merged into the deed. The court held no; merger does not
apply to those provisions of the antecedent contract which the parties did
not intend to be incorporated into the deed or which are not necessarily
performed and satisfied by the execution and delivery of the stipulated
conveyance. Contractual provisions as to considerations to be paid by
the purchaser are ordinarily not merged into the deed.27 0
267. Sorrell v. Stacy, 225 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
268. Lasseter v. Dauer, 211 So.2d 584, 585 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
269. Id.
270. Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So.2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
